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FOREWORD
The ideal of “all things considered” is a perpetual motion machine for epistemology. 
You can’t think effectively about any hard topic without relying on unexamined 
constraints, self- imposed barricades on your imagination that permit you to dismiss 
without a hearing most of the myriad candidate solutions to whatever problem you 
are concentrating on. The need for brusque heuristic pruning of the search tree is a 
fact of life, not just a fact of chess. My colleague Marcel Kinsbourne has proposed 
that what makes any problem hard is always the fact that something attractive, and 
false, stands in the way, securing allegiance that then poisons the investigation. 
Philosophers, at their best, specialize in “opening our eyes to new perspectives,” 
helping us overcome our subliminal aversions and loosen our grip on “home truths” 
that are so familiar we never stop to consider them. This delicate task calls for an 
artful mingling of arresting observations, vivid language, and a deep understanding 
of the theoretical work that has created the arena in which current disputes play 
themselves out.
Andy Clark is a peerless perspective- shifter, and the fruits of his labors are mag-
nificently on display in this volume. There is a palpable sense of intellectual com-
munity and progress on the tough issues, a sense that if we put our heads together, 
we can discern the contributions of a wide variety of apparently warring positions, 
both philosophical and scientific, and weave them into a cable of mutual agreement, 
defeasible of course, but a new path of common ground on which to pursue further 
research. The central cord of Andy’s cable, still only reluctantly endorsed or even 
resisted by some of the contributors, is (in my hardly disinterested opinion) the 
working assumption that there is nothing like élan vital, or wonder tissue, or intrinsic 
intentionality that distinguishes the mind from the rest of nature. One manifestation 
of this assumption is the Parity Principle (and the Reverse Parity Principle proposed 
by Goldstone), and another is the fruitful pursuit by all participants of continuities 
between all evolved organisms and indeed all designed tools for thinking, from 
writing and prostheses to Scrabble tiles and computers.
 
F o r e w o r dx
We totter, as usual, on the shoulders of giants: Descartes, Bayes, Skinner, Gibson, 
Fodor, and others, wielding the multitude of isms provoked or inspired by them, 
and one thing that strikes me about the discussions here is how often they ex-
pose a pendulum swinging between overstatement and oversimplification. You 
pay a price for the vividness without which you cannot hold the attention of your 
students (or colleagues): the Heartbreak of Premature Definition. What is your def-
inition of functionalism, cognitivism, enactivism, embodied cognition, representa-
tion, affordance? There are good reasons to postpone definition until after you’ve 
elaborated some of the treasures, prospects, and risks of your position, but if you 
decline to define your terms, your critics will be obliged to define them for you, 
and the result can degenerate into a food fight of counterexamples and reductios. 
Is functionalism really just behaviorism unleashed by Skinner’s 1964 observation 
that “the skin is not that important as a boundary”? What does cognitivism add 
to behaviorism, if not a dread homunculus? Once you’ve laundered all the intel-
lectualist connotations out of the concept of representation, dismantling the inner 
user, how do representations differ from resonant loops? Concentrating myopi-
cally on devising variant definitions, chisholming away in a fugue state of defensive 
strategizing, is a well- known philosophical foible, but it is not much in evidence here! 
Andy Clark sets a fine example, followed by his critics, of really trying to educe the 
best insights from the opposition, and both the essays and Andy’s gracious response 
to them provide models of philosophical behavior that should inspire and instruct 
all who enter these arenas.
This is not your grandfather’s philosophy of mind, and the contributors are the 
all- stars of the twenty- first century. Among the many volumes of essays exploring 
the ideas of one philosopher or another, this one has a rare virtue: as you read the 
essays you keep learning new things, not just novel arguments, novel objections, novel 
critiques, but facts about the world outside philosophy that philosophers ought to 
know. Who would have thought that the ingenious devices of insect mating compe-
tition, or the ethnography of ritual memory boards among the Luma, or the archi-
tecture of Differential Neural Computers, or the function of postural sway, or the 
effects of left- handedness would illuminate any philosophical controversy? As one 
who gets impatient with philosophical writing that does not inform me about any-
thing beyond the cleverness of the author, I find rewards aplenty in these pages, and 
I cannot think of a book that better exposes the limitations of traditional, factually 
impoverished philosophical combat. And like Clark’s own work, it is all eminently 
readable by nonspecialists. Too many of our colleagues in philosophy have been 
subliminally taught that philosophy that isn’t hard to read is not worth reading. This 
cheerful, and cheer- inducing, book is a fine counterexample.
Daniel C. Dennett
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1 Introduction
Matteo  Colombo ,  Liz  Irvine ,  and  Mog  Stapleton
Where is your mind? According to traditional wisdom in philosophy of mind and 
cognitive science, the machinery of your mind is just your brain. In Jerry Fodor’s 
words:  “If the mind happens in space at all, it happens somewhere north of the 
neck” (1999, 69).
While you are reading, your brain is buzzing with neural activity. Some patterns 
of neural activity support your eyes rapidly moving and then shortly fixating on the 
symbols in front of you. Other patterns of activity enable you to perceive, decode, 
and understand what you’re reading. Knock down your frontal eye fields in your 
frontal cortex, and your eye movements will be impaired. Likewise, knock down 
your visual cortex, and your visual perception of what’s in front of you will be seri-
ously damaged. All this might suggest that your mind is brain- bound.
According to traditional wisdom, there is another, more fundamental reason why 
the physical basis of human minds cannot outrun the bounds of skin and skull. If 
we ask you, “What are you doing now?”, you may reply along the following lines: “I 
want to read the introductory chapter of the volume on Andy Clark’s philosophy, 
and I have reason to believe that moving my eyes and body in certain ways, and 
perceiving and deriving meaning from the symbols in front of me, is one way to get 
the job done.” You would thus offer us an explanation of your behaviour by citing 
the beliefs and desires you entertain.
Importantly, the mental states cited in this explanation have a unique property. 
They are about things: they possess intentionality and have “content” (making them 
“semantically evaluable”). The sentences on this page have content too, but their con-
tent derives from our mental states. Sentences, and indeed any other piece of the 
external world, are often said to have “derived intentionality.” They would not have 
any meaning unless it was conferred on them by people who use those sentences to 
express their thoughts and communicate with others. So, if external items do not 
mean anything on their own, and the mark of the mental is intentionality, then the 
mental cannot overflow the boundaries of skin and skull. And citing bits of the envi-
ronment in explaining intelligent behaviour will not play the unique role played by 
intrinsically meaningful, content- having, causally efficacious mental states.
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In sum, according to traditional wisdom, the physical substrate of the mind 
cannot reside outside of our heads, and explanations of intelligent behaviour must 
always look for content- having, causally efficacious states within the boundaries of 
skin and skull.
Over the course of his career, Andy Clark has systematically challenged both of 
these tenets in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Clark’s challenge has 
primarily come on two fronts. On the metaphysical front, he has tried to show how a 
form of functionalism opens the door to the possibility that the vehicles of thought 
can overflow the causal transactions that take place within our skulls. This form of 
functionalism can be captured in a “Parity Principle,” which Clark and Chalmers 
(1998, 8) formulated as follows: “If, as we confront some task, a part of the world 
functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation 
in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is . . . part 
of the cognitive process.”
Here is the basic idea: if what makes something a certain type of cognitive state 
or process depends not on its internal constitution or on its physical instantiation, 
but rather on the coarse functional role it plays in a system, then it is a prejudice 
to maintain that the mind must be instantiated within the skull. When external 
devices, systems, and other structures in the world function sufficiently like things 
or processes people would normally regard as cognitive, were they to occur inside 
the skull, then they too could figure as proper parts of our cognitive system (Clark 
and Chalmers 1998; Clark 1997, 2008).
This proposal has generated a productive controversy in the metaphysics of mind, 
under the banner of the “Extended Mind” debate, and in the philosophy of mind 
and cognitive science more generally, under the banner of “Extended Cognition.” 
In the first section of this volume David Chalmers, Fred Adams, Katalin Farkas, and 
Mike Wheeler articulate cutting- edge criticisms of the arguments presented in these 
debates, and make original proposals for the future direction of this research. Both 
Chalmers and Farkas focus on how exactly to specify the extended mind thesis, in-
cluding how to interpret some of its early examples, and press on the possibility of 
consciousness extending. Adams argues that Clark’s failure to specify what “cogni-
tion” is undermines his argument that cognition extends; and Wheeler pushes this 
style of analysis further in terms of the debates between the first and second “waves” 
of the extended mind debate.
Clark’s arguments have also extended into a wider program investigating 
“Embodied, Embedded, Enactive and Affective” cognition, in which he has argued 
that details of the bodies of agents, as well as worldly resources, make essential 
contributions to explanations of a great many cases of intelligent behaviour (Clark 
1997, 2004, 2008). The remaining chapters in the first section of this volume ex-
pand on this theme. Ken Aizawa pursues Clark’s claims about the role of language 
in metacognition and related implications of extended cognition. Larry Shapiro 
defends the view (against Clark’s “larger mechanism” framework) that the body 
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makes a “special contribution” to cognition. Michelle Maiese argues that affectivity 
is embodied and embedded, but not extended.
The hypotheses of extended, embodied, and embedded cognition have been 
taken up further in the informatics disciplines and in AI, in terms of Clark’s pro-
posal that humans are “natural- born cyborgs.” This suggests that we are beings who 
routinely incorporate parts of the world into our cognition, using these not only to 
extend our cognitive capacities, but also to realise many novel cognitive capacities. 
The chapters in part 2 explore this theme.
Louise Barrett uses the theme of evolutionary (dis)continuity between humans 
and other animals to challenge the role of representationalism in Clark’s work, and 
to question whether reliance on artefacts increases or decreases cognitive load. Rob 
Goldstone turns the Parity Principle around, and proposes that we can “hack” our 
own perceptual systems to provide new mental tools. David Kirsh develops a novel 
way to distinguish cognitive extension from cognitive embedding, and suggests 
that real cognitive extension is only ever brief and temporary. Kim Sterelny charts 
a methodologically cautious history and evolution of human reliance on materi-
ally scaffolded cognition. This concludes discussion of the first front of Clark’s 
arguments against the received view about cognition and the nature of the mind.
On the second front, Clark has argued against classicist ideas about cognition. 
The classicist conception of cognition is one in which the mind functions like a dig-
ital computer, manipulating symbols according to a set of rules, where the symbols 
consist of concepts similar to the lexical items found in natural languages. However, 
Clark has argued that the functional profile of a system need not feature sym-
bolic items that track natural language concepts, and so need not be “semantically 
transparent.” This means that the representational items that feature in a system’s 
processes need not relate in a systematic way to features of the world that can be 
picked out propositionally, with the expressive resources of public language (Clark 
1989, 1993). Even systems without this semantic transparency can be justifiably 
taken to possess genuinely intentional states that play an important, though not ex-
clusive, explanatory role for cognitive activities (Clark 1997, 2013).
Explanations of intelligent behaviour that rely on connectionist neural networks, 
dynamical system modelling, Bayesian modelling and predictive coding illuminate 
this explanatory shift. In these alternative approaches, contentful mental states like 
thoughts, beliefs and desires can be characterised as distributed sets of biases and 
structures in a system that is poised to pick up statistical structure in the data it 
encounters when it interacts with the environment. In this case, mental states need 
not consist of contentful symbols, but typically consist of fluid, distributed, proba-
bilistic, and superpositional structures acquired at different time scales, which are 
far from semantically transparent (i.e., it’s not easy to read off their meaning and 
how they are related to each other). And yet this opacity should not suggest that the 
system does not possess genuinely intentional states or internal representations, or 
that it cannot support the productivity and systematicity of thought.
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All this may naturally suggest that we should be looking at a diverse and disunified 
array of explanatory resources in order to understand how minds emerge from the 
complex cooperation of brain processes with bodily form, action, and the canny 
use of environmental structures. While this conclusion seems to follow naturally 
from Clark’s work, Clark (2013, 2016) has in fact resisted it in his most recent proj-
ect. In this, he argues that the embodied mind’s rag bag of tricks and stratagems 
may be unified through a few core principles grounded in the view that the brain 
is a multi- layered probabilistic prediction machine. Instead of being passive, feed-
forward accumulators of environmental features, brains are active predictors of 
environmental signals. Hierarchically organized networks of neurons encode hi-
erarchically organized statistical models of the environment, which they employ 
to make predictions about their next sensory state. As a function of the way in 
which observed sensory input proves these predictions to be wrong, the neurally 
encoded statistical models get updated and redeployed to make fresh predictions 
that organisms use to aptly navigate their environment. In this continuous cycle 
of prediction- error- based updating guided by action- perception loops, embodied 
brains become better and better at predicting environmental structures that matter 
for their own survival and flourishing.
In this exciting picture of brain function, action, perception, attention, and con-
sciousness are painted as continuously co- constructed around the same funda-
mental computational routine: prediction- error minimization. Thus, our embodied, 
embedded, extended, and spatially and temporally distributed cognition is to be 
grounded in an orchestrated attempt to individually and collectively minimize 
the error in our predictions about specific sensorimotor trajectories in our local 
environments.
However, it is early days for predicting whether the predictive processing account 
will deliver a genuinely unified science of the embodied mind. This issue is taken up 
in part 3 of the volume. A number of authors in this section question the fit between 
predictive processing and Clark’s earlier work on extended, enactive, and embodied 
cognition. Mike Anderson and Tony Chemero offer a different reading of how the 
predictive processing framework might fit with radical embodiment, which highlights 
the role of ecological information and downplays the concepts of prediction, models, 
and representation. Somewhat differently again, Karl Friston recommends an 
enactivist and embodied version of predictive processing in which agents need not 
always have (representational) models of their environments but simply are models of 
their environments in virtue of existing. Jakob Hohwy argues that the representational 
demands of predictive processing are not consistent with the kind of mind- world re-
lationship that Clark is committed to. Nico Orlandi and Geoff Lee examine Clark’s 
interpretation of the predictive processing framework and argue that it preserves tra-
ditional (and non- Clarkian) distinctions between perception and action. Jesse Prinz 
offers a critical overview of Clark’s work and raises the question of whether it is pos-
sible for any single account of cognition to be explanatorily adequate. Anil Seth uses 
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the resources of predictive processing applied to interoception to explain the phe-
nomenology of embodiment, selfhood, and subjectivity. Barbara Webb uses test cases 
of insect cognition to analyse whether predictive processing does in fact capture how 
simpler cognitive organizations such as those of insects function.
In the final section of the volume, Andy Clark offers responses to all the critics (and 
friends) who have contributed to this volume. His hope is to achieve, as he puts it, “a 
single, not wildly inconsistent, narrative.”
This volume, like the work it engages with, is incredibly broad in scope and will 
serve to showcase and encapsulate Clark’s imaginative explorations of mind and its 
place in nature. Andy has been a sparkly inspiration to us. Smart and curious, he has 
taught us how to think big and take chances, explore new intellectual territories, and 
face up to questions that have the potential to impact human life, and all with grace 
and humility. We hope that this volume will likewise inspire future generations of 
researchers in the sciences of mind.
I feel released
Bad times deceased
My confidence has increased
Reality is here
The game has been disbanded
My mind has been expanded.
— Richard O’Brien, “Rose Tint My World,”  
The Rocky Horror Picture Show (1975)
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